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RESPONSE
CONTEMPLATING SINHA'S
ANTHROPOCENTRIC THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A BASIS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS
by Eugene D. Fryer*
I.

INTRODUCTION

At times we must recognize the value of the contemplative pause in
our consideration of the status and direction of the international protection of human rights. The scholar, the policy maker, the partisan-all are
advised to test their human rights assumptions for the sanguine. This is
not to concede that some optimism is inappropriate or dispensable to any
human rights endeavor, ranging from human rights theorizing to human
rights advocacy.
The contemplative pause is particularly appropriate to consideration
of the anthropocentric theory of international law, proposed by S.
Prakash Sinha in a past issue of this Journal and advanced by him as an
"intellectually sound" basis for human rights theory.1 The discussion
which follows will examine what appears to be the chief vulnerability of
this theory: its insulation, despite attempts by its author, from the domestic and international context in which human rights indeed do
subsist.
The anthropocentric theory of international law is offered as a further step toward operationalizing in the human rights area the "functional" international law theory.2 According to the functional view, contemporary state relations are increasingly shifting from the horizontal
* Chief Professor, International Law Division, The Judge Advocate General's School,
U.S. Army; J.D., University of Georgia, 1970; L.L.M. (International Law), Georgetown University Law Center, 1976; Member, Bar of the State of Florida; Member, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. The views of the author do not purport to
reflect the position of the United States Department of the Army or of the United States
Department of Defense.

I Sinha, The Anthropocentric Theory of International Law as a Basis for Human
Rights, 10 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 469 (1978).
2 See W. FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRuCruRE op INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (1964); W.
FRE DMAN, LAW IN A CHANGING Socmrry 465 (2d. ed. 1972).
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plane of interaction between coexisting states toward the vertical, increasingly integrated relations between cooperating states. It is said that this
shift is impelled by the conditions of modern life: population density, resource scarcity, the proliferation of states. These combine under conditions highlighting the interlocking, interdependent nature of the presentday international order.$ From the nature of these relationships it should
follow, according to the functionalist view, that the rules governing the
affairs of this interdependent community should be based upon a broadening consensual basis. Not only should the range of issues subject to
consensus be broadening, but the quality or depth of consensus within
4
this range should be intensifying.
Sinha's anthropocentric theory of international law and of an anthropocentric basis for human rights represents a perceptive assessment of
this consensual base. Sinha employs several reductive techniques in order
to arrive at the maximum defensible core concept of human rights-at
the human rights imperative.8 This human right imperative is identified
as meeting the needs of man's planetary existence with justice.6
From this general human rights imperative Sinha distinguishes (taking care not to counterpose or dichotomize) the further and important
task of cataloging human rights.7 Where others, such as McDougal, linguistically and therefore presumably ontologically approach the human
rights catalog
in terms of "values," Sinha treats the catalog in terms of
"needs." 8 This catalog of needs is arranged, presumably hierarchically,

Sinha, supra note 1, at 497.

'The maximum case for interdependence demanding international consensus is stated
by Richard Falk. R. FALK, THIs ENDANGERED PLANET 292 (1971). A more moderate assessment of the consensual base and of its amenability toward a broadening policy-based international jurisprudence encompassing the full spectrum of human rights is stated by Myres
McDougal and associates. See M. McDouGAL & F. FELiCIANO, LAW AND MINMUM WoRLD
PUBLIC ORDER 95 (1961); McDougal, Lasswell, Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of
Authoritative Decision, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73 (R. Falk &
C. Black eds. 1969); McDougal, Lasswell, Chen, The Aggregate Interests in Shared Respect
and Human Rights, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv., 183 (1977); McDougal, Lasswell, Chen, Human
Rights in Comprehensive Context, 72 Nw. U. L. REV., 227 (1977).

Sinha, supra note 1, at 501.
8Id.

7 Id. at 497.
IT]he anthropocentric needs of planetary existence may be classified as follows:
1.
Primary needs:
a.

Air

b.
c.
d.
e.

Food
Water
Procreation (population control, population redistribution)
Protection of life from:

(i) War
(ii) Crime
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into primary and secondary needs. Most reasonably perceived as primary
are the essentials of life, and as secondary, man's achievement of intangible values. The latter are generally stated as "freedoms" and "liberties."9
Both the imperative and the catalog merit detailed examination. My critique will follow an examination of the reductive methodology which
guides Sinha in this attempt at an apparently modest and realistic approach to human rights.
II.

THE ANTHROPOCENTRIC THEORY

An adequate theory of human rights, according to Sinha, must provide that the needs of man's planetary existence be met with justice. This
concept will shape the catalog of particular human needs or rights so as
to prescribe the direction in which international law is to develop in order
to remain relevant and credible. 10 Sinha comprehensively reviews several
historical and extant human rights theories, then rejects them as failing
for various reasons to measure up to standards which he prescribes for an
adequate theory of human rights. The theories reviewed include several
based in natural law,11 theories based on the being of man as man,1 2 the
14
theory of the equality of man,13 and theories based upon social utility.
These are seen as having failed to meet the needs of man with justice.
According to Sinha, to provide a viable human rights imperative and to
serve as a defensible basis for a catalog of human rights, a human rights
15
theory must accomplish all of the following:
A. furnish a compelling justification for human rights;
B. provide a principle for both the protection of the individual and
for the positive fulfillment of his needs;
C. account for the historicity of human rights;
(iii) Disease

2.

(iv) Starvation
(v) Killers of modem life (transportation, industry).
Secondary needs:
a. Economic betterment (availability, exploitation, and mobility of resources;
development of technology and its transfer)
b. Cultural enrichment (conditions of work, leisure, and participation in culc.

tural goods)
Achievement of intangible values (freedoms, liberties).

Id. 497-98.
gId. at 498.
"Id. at 497.
1'Id. at 482.
:2Id. at 490.
"Id. at 492.
' Id. at 493-95.
"Id. at 475.
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D. enable an order of priority to operate upon any catalog of human
rights;
E. allow for revision of human rights;
F. accommodate cultural relativity;
G. accommodate ideological relativity;
H. accommodate economic and technological relativity.
The anthropocentric theory of international law as a basis for human
rights is offered as meeting these tests. This consummate achievement is
in no small part due to the reductive methodology only briefly stated but
elaborately footnoted. 16 Such methodology strongly suggests the determinative tendency of scholarship which seeks to apply to inexact propositions the exact methodology more appropriate to the natural sciences or
to finite proposals. This reductive characterization of the human rights
problem also demonstrates the tendency to render manageable an elusive
subject matter by precise categorization, as here by an appealing and sim17
plified hierarchy of human needs.
Thus, Sinha explains his methodology as reductive in the following
respects: 8
A. in bypassing all theories and explanatory concepts about human
rights and focusing upon the object itself which is under examination
(philosophical reduction);
B. by eliminating the factual elements of the object under examination so as to perceive its essence through discerning its typical structure
(eidetic reduction);
C. by eliminating other objects of consciousness to disclose the consciousness or intentionality of the object under examination, "thereby enabling the consciousness to perceive itself in pure transcendental ego"'
(transcendental reduction).
It is at this methodological stage that the anthropocentric theory unavoidably assumes some of the very defects which in Sinha's view have
consigned earlier human rights theories to the junkheap. To a degree
boldly surpassing earlier theories, and by far outpacing other variants of
today's functionalist international law approaches, the anthropocentric
theory discounts the politically particularized character of the contemporary international order. Sinha assumes the existence or formation of a
community of international interests, or values, which simply has not and
does not inhere in reality. This defect contaminates the methodology
which leads to the anthropocentric theory of human rights and contaminates the perspective from which the anthropocentric theory is seen as
16
17

Id. at 495-97.
Id. at 497-98.

18 Id. at 496.
19 Id.
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meeting the test of an adequate human rights theory. It likewise contaminates the human rights catalog which springs from this theory.
A more moderate, realistic task for legal theory would be premised
upon the open-ended character of the domestic and international environment in which human rights subsist. Linguistic manipulations which
attempt to fit human rights phenomena into abstract methodology hide
the political element, but only for purposes of scholarship. 0 To this extent human rights scholarship is disabled from describing reality, either
superficially or essentially, and is discredited from prescribing credible
action or shaping attitudes at the popular or policy levels. The anthropocentric theory of international law and of human rights, despite its reductive simplicity and appeal, thus fails to account for either the "is" or the
"ought" in an international system where state interest and power considerations still far outweigh an evolving sense
of interdependent community
21
and an evolving minimum consensus.
Instead it is now urged here, that in deriving a human rights imperative and a human rights catalog, one must reckon with the social conflict
and struggle which result from human selfishness and power interests.
These human attributes are perhaps as historically based as man's reductively deduced primary needs. That they might be scientifically isolated
and engineered away for the purpose of a definable human rights theory
is perhaps the ultimate exercise in futile theorizing.2 2 It is proposed here,
less scientifically, that human rights theory can be an amalgam rather
than a single focus.2 3 Similarly, beyond theory, an action program for securing the international protection of human rights realistically can and
must be founded on issue-based relations among and between states,
from which ultimately some human rights consensus will emerge, rather
than the opposite.2 4
III.

THE IMPACT OF STATE INTEREST ON SINHA's THEORY

REQuIsITEs

That man has been "catapulted from his state to the entire planet
for his existence in an unprecedented way" 25 makes only a wishful case
for an international human rights law which might or will be based upon
shared human values derived through a heightened sense of interdependence. The following examination of Sinha's view of the requirements of
an adequate human rights theory is based upon the view that the envi20 Cohen, The PoliticalElement in Legal Theory, 88 YALE L.J. 1, 35 (1978).
21H. BuLL, Tim ANARcicAL SocIrY 13 (1977).
H. MORGENTHAU, SciNInIc MAN VS. PoWER POLITICS 1 (1946).
Cohen, supra note 20, at 8.
24Fryer, Soviet Human Rights: Law and Politics in Perspective, 43 L. & CoNTEMP.
2

23

PROB. 303 (1979).
15 Sinha, supra note 1, at 497.
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ronment in which human rights subsist is a politicized environment in
which state interests, by reductive methodology, cannot be diminished for
scholastic purposes nor by-passed 26 for operational purposes. This conclusion is reluctantly drawn in full appreciation of the compelling facts that
indeed spell out growing global interdependence. These facts do call for a
sensible jurisprudence and for a supporting theory capable of conforming
international behavior to reasonable expectations of vertical cooperation.
Such jurisprudence and theory are preferred to the perpetuation of ruinous horizontal antagonism and competition.
Sinha's theory requisites can do much in this positive direction. But
,his reduction of the evidence does not justify that man-centered law and
policy should or will emerge. Rather, any variant condition along the cooperation-competition continuum is possible and likely. By the same device that a world of anthropocentric focus might bear out today's tentative anthropocentric international law theory, a world at some other
point, up to man-negating ruin, might perfectly bear out any other tentative international law formulation.
At the present stage of international relations, despite evidence of
interdependence, global relations are at best thought of as carried out in
an "international system," not an "international society. ' 27 "International
system" presumes that states, in some form similar to that of present
states, shall be the primary unit of socio-political activity. Beyond this,
"society," for human rights purposes, requires that states perceive that
they are bound by a roughly common set of rules in their human rights
relations with one another 8 and therefore necessarily with regard to the
treatment of their own nationals. As between an international system and
an international society there will exist, respectively on the one hand,
those areas where rules are seen as basically hortatory and aspirational,
and, on the other hand, where they are seen as fairly fixed and honored.
In the intermediate range, descriptive of today, the "rules" may be tentative and inchoate,2 9 subject to fleshing out and to affirmation or refutation by state bahavior.
State behavior will be based upon perceived self-interest. The merit
of functionalist theories of international law is that they recognize that
states might act upon the evidence of interdependence, among other factors, in leaning toward increased international cooperation and toward
domestic behavior compatible with enhanced protection of human rights.
But the anthropocentric theory, applied to human rights, assigns too
great weight to the interdependence factor and too little to state interest.
26 Id. at

500.

H. BULL, supra note 21, at 13.
28 Id.
27

29 Id. at 15.
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The following contemplation of Sinha's theory requisites also takes evidence of global interdependence at its maximum value. This is so that the
case for global society, or at least for global non-antagonism, may be postulated accurately. Beyond this, the element of state interest will be factored, as follows, into each of Sinha's theory requisites to ascertain its
antipodal impact upon human rights theory 'nd upon human rights policy and practice.
A. An adequate human rights theory must furnish a compelling
justification for human rights.3 0 Sinha's treatment of this requisite is
quite terse, barely extending beyond the axiomatic statement of the requisite. His preceding exposition, critique and rejection of the several past
and extant human rights theories disables them in their major aspects
from furnishing a compelling justification for human rights. The anthropocentric theory is offered with no more than a priori or perhapi reductive certitude that it must fill the bill, in the absence of an alternative, as
the adequate human rights theory.3 1 Little is done to demonstrate to the
reader that any theory of human rights is compelled or that human rights
might not ascend to some uniformly high level of protection without the
mantel of theory. I propose that just such a result might be secured by ad
hoc experience and with minimum debilitation to the cause of human
rights. We might look for this purpose to human rights formulations perhaps bearing less dignity than theory3 2 but which comport with the domestic, bilateral, multilateral, or universal relations in question.
B. An adequate human rights theory must provide a principle for
both the protection of the individual and the positive fulfillment of his
needs.3 3 Here the anthropocentric theory as a basis for human rights is
self-negating when the protection-fulfillment function is considered along
with Sinha's theory requisites of cultural, ideological and economic relativity, discussed below. There must be a cut-off point, lacking in the anthropocentric theory, beyond which relativity must give way to individual
protection and need fulfillment. Otherwise, with a little imagination we
may proceed from the anthropocentric bottoming of human rights theory
to Sinha's need hierarchy and its catalog of rights only to find states engaging in human rights dissemble. Under the immunity of ideological relativity, for example, states may cut off or bias the fulfillment of needs out
of self-perceived state interest. The human rights concept and catalog
cannot be considered disjunctively if man's needs, particularly "secondary" or liberty-based needs, are to be assured any meaningful
realization.
30 Sinha, supra note 1, at 476.
S1 Id. at 501.
3,
3

Cohen, supra note 20, at 35.
Sinha, supra note 1, at 476.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

Vol. 12:575

Human rights thinking, at the level of theory or otherwise, must be
concerned with the kind of primary political community which is to provide the human rights context. The anthropocentric theory therefore is
open-ended with regard to both the kind and arrangement of authority
within political communities and with regard to the types of values to
which a legal order is committed. Sinha maintains that an anthropocentric human rights theory will provide the juridical base necessary to
"[s]ecure recognition from the state of the individual's security against its
power, .... tQ provide institutional machinery to effectuate that security ....

to formulate demands toward realization of [man's] values...

[and] to mobilize the state's resources and to harness its institutional machinery toward fulfillment of those demands." Otherwise, in the absence
of an anthropocentric, therefore "common" reference 5 to invoke, the individual is upon his own resources, e.g., appeal "to moral principles and
public opinion." 8 Therefore, according to Sinha, the domestic value of
the anthropocentric theory is that it will place the conflict between the
37
citizen and his state at a "juridically cognizable" level.
What at this point deprives the anthropocentrically based human
rights concept of coherence and authority is that the character of the
state matrix in which the human right or need is to be articulated and
implemented is not stipulated. Perhaps to do so would be utopian, or for
the theoretician gratuitous or interventionist. Indeed, the shape of the
model community may be elusive or unknown. But any consideration of a
human rights formulation, theoretical or otherwise, in the opinion of this
observer should at least postulate an "open" domestic political order.
"Open" means a state structure in which some pluralist influences may
operate, or at the minimum, exist as a factor to be reckoned with by state
authority. In this sense, the open domestic political order must exist with
regard to much of the spectrum of domestic issues. The question of the
protection and fulfillment of man's needs will then operate not by leave
of state recognition or by state deference to a human rights formulation.
Rather, the assurance of human rights will be more likely because of the
effective influence inhering in a right coupled with a measure of political
power. Therefore an adequate human rights formulation, theory or otherwise, must reconcile the necessity for an open domestic political order
with the requirement, stated by Sinha, that the human rights formulation
be congenial to cultural, ideological and economic relativity.
C. An adequate human rights theory must account for the historic-

36

Id.
Id.
Id.

37

Id.

34
36
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ity of human rights.38 Human rights are fundamental in nature and ontological in character "... and relate to man in his historicity."39 Unfortunately, Sinha's focus at this point shifts from man's needs to human
rights. Distinguished from man's rights, the historicity of man's needs inevitably tracks with the course of man's existence. Sinha's catalog of
needs, both primary and secondary, is an accurate representation of the
hierarchy of man's needs, historically or otherwise determined. But on
the question of historicity, to characterize the need as a right is to undo a
case well stated only for the historicity of human need. Look at the historical record of the status of man's needs as "right." At once the character of need as right becomes so fragile as to exist mainly as need striving
for the status of right, as unfulfilled right, or as right denied. There is
little iii the nature of human right as such to suggest that the notion
contains its own authority, particularly if the right theories rejected by
Sinha 4° are beyond reference. Instead, we have resort only to the nonpersuasive authority of the historically enduring but historically extinguishable needs of man.
Again, on the issue of historicity, the anthropocentric basis of human
rights theory is in need of an environmental postulate. The realistic requisites of a human rights formulation should acknowledge that in man's
historical course, human rights have fared poorly in the political community in which tolerance for human needs or rights was not a primary contextual feature. This point requires only a footnote to 20th century experience. Consider the contempt for human needs or rights, either primary
or secondary, which is too often ubiquitous in authoritarian societies.
Consider, for example, evidence of such outrageous contempt in the
apartheidal, Kampuchean or Ugandan variants of such authoritarian societies. Little exercise is required for the human rights theorist to recognize
that human rights cannot prosecute its own brief if left merely to the
authority of history. The tolerant domestic political structure, at least
minimally accommodating to human needs, if only at Sinha's primary
level of need, is essential to an adequate theory of human rights.
D. An adequate human rights theory must enable an order of priority to operate upon any catalog of human rights.4 1 The pressures of
scarcity, of the finitude of resources, material and institutional, have de42
livered human rights theory up from the earlier theoretical attempts
which have proved inadequate in dealing with global interdependence.
as

Id.

39 Id.
40

That is, the theories founded upon natural law, upon the being of man as man, upon

the equality of man, or upon social utility or upon any combination of these. Id. at 482.
" Id. at 477.
42 Id. at 483-84.
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Now an adequate human rights theory must operate with this limitation
in view. 43 The chief devices permitting this in the anthropocentric theory
are the conceptual requisites that the economic limitations of states to
fulfill human needs be respected and that domestic priorities, ideological
and perhaps cultural concerning human rights be respected.
Too many questions arise here. First, who is called upon to respect
economic, ideological and cultural diversity? Outsiders? National authorities? Nationals of the state? To whose benefit is this deference to run?
State authorities? Nationals-and among them, ingroups? Outgroups?
How binding is the injunction to respect diversity? Beyond the conceptual plane, what is the impact of all this upon the order and degree to
which man's needs are to be met along Sinha's hierarchical structure of
needs? Let us assume that material and institutional scarcity at some
point are responsive to management. How then does the time element
operate upon the priority for realization of man's hierarchical needs, allowing for ideological, cultural and economic relativity, which themselves
are subject to mutation with time?
An adequate human rights theory must contain the seeds of mandate
if human rights in concept or catalog are to ripen in serial fulfillment or
otherwise, and taken individually, if human needs, even of the primary
sort, are to be met straightforward. Otherwise the need remains less than
a right, inchoate, 44 as a conditional or deferred right. With respect to
Sinha's secondary or liberty-based needs, scarcity societies have proceeded to relative abundance and nevertheless have deferred or conditioned these rights.4 5 Beyond such cases, it is all too commonplace that
building nations defer the meeting of human needs, primary and secondary, in a manner which is suggestive of syndrome. 46 The tough decisions
concerning resource allocation and the reconciliation of ideology and
human need are too easily postponed.
While these decisions may await the reasonable realization of optimal
domestic conditions so long as fundamental needs of human survival are
met, it is not in the interests of the denizens concerned that a laissez
faire human rights doctrine permit indefinite procrastination. It is not in
the interests of an interdependent world that this result be prescribed,
and it is a self-inflicted wound upon a human rights formulation which
assumes this sort of deferential baggage. Respect for the national integrity of states in resolving their own problems, in ordering their own priorities already is optimally articulated in international law, for example in
4 Id. at 477.
" Cohen, supra note 20, at 25.

4' See, e.g., U.S.S.R. CONST. of 1977, art. 50, para. 1, reprinted in CURENT DIG. Sovir
PRESS, Nov. 9, 1977, at 1-13.
" J. KAUTSKy, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNIZATION 44, 139 (1972).

ANTHROPOCENTRIC CRITIQUE

1980

United Nations Charter norms on non-interference in domestic affairs of
states 47 and in the prohibition on the use or threat of use of force in state
relations. 48 Universal standards for the self-determination of peoples are
well defined. 49 Colonialism"0 and hegemonism51 in their many variants
have been adequately proscribed. A human rights formulation need strain
no further in elevating a deference to "national course" to a proportion
which is self-cancelling of the potential for the fuller realization of international human rights.
E. An adequate human rights theory must allow for the revision of
human rights. 52 Human rights indeed are well served, as suggested by

this requisite that human rights be revisable "in consonance with either a
shift in needs or an emergence of new needs in the historical experience
of man." 53 The anthropocentric theory should proceed further to treat the
minimum characteristics of the domestic political environment which are
essential for these emerging needs to be articulated and to be recognized
as rights. Questions of the amenability of the domestic system to affirmative rights revision again should address the issues of system openness.
For example, by what initiative might the felt need come forward as incipient right? By what impulse might the state apparatus respond? Or
may the state, in the same manner as it may deal inertially with the question of priorities, discussed above, likewise deal inertially with the related
issues concerning the revisability of human rights. At least by way of dictum, an adequate human rights theory should touch upon the character
of the domestic political order most hospitable to the revisability of
human rights.
F. An adequate human rights theory must accommodate cultural
relativity.54 In the final three theory requisites: cultural, ideological and
economic relativity, the anthropocentric theory achieves self-eradicating
simplicity. Sinha realistically perceives a working "challenge to any theart. 2, para. 7; see also note 49 infra.
Id. art. 2, para. 4, and note 49 infra.
4, Declaration on Principles of International Law Governing Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), 121, U.N. Doc. A/8029 (1970).
50 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. REs. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
51Supra note 50 passim; see also Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention,
G.A. Rs. 2321, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 11), U.N. Doc. A/0014 (1965).
52 Sinha, supra note 1, at 477.
I" Sinha cites here the emerging right of privacy dimly forseen and unarticulated at the
time of the drafting of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but obvious now in
light of technological developments and in the enhanced capability of state authority to
intrude into the individual's sphere. Id. at 478.
47 U.N. CHARTER

4

Id.
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ory of human rights on the international plane" 55 when he speaks of a
presumed tendency of certain human rights standards to be infused with
dogmatic, cultural content. What it does mean, he says,
is that an American, who is accustomed to marriage between consenting
spouses cannot, without being dogmatic, insist upon the abolition of arranged marriages in the village of Daryabad in India, for example; this is
especially so when the record of his own culture is just about as unsuccessful as that of Daryabad in achieving marital bliss by reason of the
particular way of getting espoused. 56
According to Sinha, as a practical working matter the real business
between states is not "culturally particularized," e.g., diplomatic inter57
course, territorial concerns, regulation of activities in the sea, and so on.
Accordingly, this requisite of cultural relativity should be no real impediment to orderly international relations.
But what if the business between states is a controversy over the verified abuse by one state of the culture of its own nationals? Again footnoting twentieth century and contemporary experience, are not such
abuses too often the first step toward the massive denial of rights which
are far more fundamental than bare cultural practice?"" The anthropocentric theory, read as a whole, throws an unfortunate hands-off bias onto
cultural doings within the domestic system. This is largely the result of
the combined effect of the three relativist theory requirements, of the order of priority requirement, and of the apparently disadvantaged placement of cultural concerns at the periphery of the anthropocentric scheme
of human needs. For the anthropocentric theory to serve as an adequate
basis for human rights theory, its cultural relativity requirement should
be expanded in some measure from the purely interstate proscription as
it now stands, to include as well the prescriptive mandate for cultural
relativism attaching within domestic systems.
G. An adequate human rights theory must accommodate ideological relativity.59 The thrust of the anthropocentric theory here is to treat
human rights in an ideologically plural context,06 and in this respect the
anthropocentric inquiry has come at last to grips with the self-willed
character of the domestic human rights environment. Sinha prescribes
s Id. at 480 n. 42.
Id. at 479, citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. REs. 217 A (III),
U.N. Doc., A/810 (1948).
7 Sinha, supra note 1, at 480 n.42.
58 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, entered
into force on Jan. 12, 1951. 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
59 Sinha, supra note 1, at 480.
60 Id. at 481, citing Murphy, Ideological Interpretationsof Human Rights, 21 DE PAUL
L. REv. 286 (1971-1972).
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the adequate human rights theory:6 1
[I]t must strive for the minimization of injustice to the individuals within
the conceptural framework of their respective ideological models. Nor
can that theory validly proceed upon the presumption that one ideology
or the other is totally inconsist with the demands of human rights.
My remarks above concerning individual protection and need fulfillment within the domestic political environment apply here. Ideologies, of
course, need not be taken as exclusive prescriptions for the fulfillment of
human rights. Consider the convergence based views of Roling that the
traditional "international law of liberty" espoused by prosperous European states is trending toward a contemporary "international law of welfare. 8s 2 This shift tracks with the mutation of the competitive, horizontal
international law of coexistence toward a vertical international law of cooperation, seen by Friedman, noted by Sinha, above. Illustrative of this
trend is the growing predominance in international human rights statements of economic based human rights vis &zvis "spiritual" rights.6 3 A
recent pronouncement of the emerging international law of welfare is the
Yugoslav proposal on the New International Economic Order (NIEO).6
In the Yugoslav view, "It is not a question of a 'revolutionary' destruction
of the existing international economic law, but of a gradual substantive
changing and adjustment to new relations in the world."' 5
Given the presumed relative permanency of the two foremost antagonistic ideological positions, represented in the bourgeois (United States)
and socialist (Soviet)6 sense, human rights values can be maximized only
6

Sinha, supra note 1, at 481.

B. ROLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED WORLD 83, 104 (1960).
63 See, e.g., the increasingly distinct treatment given to economic and to "spiritual"
human rights standards from the time of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
62

supra note 56, up through the time of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. REs. 2200, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), and
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. REs. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), 49-52 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
" Proposal for the Establishment of a Committee of The International Law Association
of the New International Economic Order, Yugoslav Association of International Law, Executive Committee, Belgrade, February 20, 1978, reprinted by the Philippine Branch of The
International Law Association for the 58th Conference of The International Law Association
(Aug. 27-Sep. 2, 1978), Manila, Philippines.
65 Id. at 4. A substantially deideologized and compelling assessment of the economic
realignment necessary for global equity is offered in the comprehensive Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues Under the Chairmanship of
Willy Brandt, NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAm FOR SuRvIvAL, MIT Press, Cambridge (1980).
66 For the Soviet view, see CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (G. Tunkin ed. Progress
Publishers, Moscow, 1969) passim; Tunkin, InternationalLaw and Ideological Struggle,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 24 (Nov. 1971) passim; G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(W.Butler, trans, intro. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1974), passim.
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through non-antagonistic, issue-based dealings. The rules pertaining to
these dealings must be compatible with respect for the opposite ideology
and must work to enhance the protection of human rights without an
insufferable public impact upon the ideology of either party.67 This approach is also adaptable to the different interest positions in the law of
the sea, NIEO, and other resource and development related issues.
But is it beyond human rights theory to recognize that certain domestic political forms are more hostile to fundamental human rights than
are other domestic politcal forms? To stretch ideological tolerance to the
point of condemning in principle but not anathematizing the human
rights breaches of which unchecked authoritarianism is capable is to frustrate the formulation. This is akin to the blithe humanitarianism which
condemns the carnage of war while benignly blinking past the institution
of war. Sinha therefore is encouraged to proceed further in his research
from the finding that no "one ideology or the other is totally inconsistent
with the demands of human rights. ' 68 Such further effort might delve
into the antagonism toward human rights which might be typical of both
capitalist and socialist systems and at all points along the open-authoritarian political spectrum. Such an effort might be overly empirical for an
initial theoretical formulation. I would nevertheless expect the theoretical
effort at least to lop off and reject as incompatible with human rights
those particular facets of domestic political orders by which the negative
human rights context comes to far outweigh the positive.69 And this
search for the hospitable human rights environment reasonably can condemn both sweat shop capitalism, ideologically based apartheid, Soviet
psychiatric repression,70 and Kampuchean genocide "1 as anathematized
products of ideologies. I doubt that this would offend the ideological rela67 Fryer, supra note 24, at 297.

Sinha, supra note 1, at 481.
6'There is so little value in citing as a saving virtue of Soviet socialism that it makes
medical service and education freely available to its citizenry while pointing out at the same
time that "legal protection against abuses of human rights by the central authorities is extremely weak under the soviet system since the central leadership has complete de facto
control over the legislature. . . ." Sinha, supra note 1, at 482, n. 50. Is not one stated requisite of an adequate human rights theory is that it "secure recognition from the state of the
individual's security against its power," id., at 476, and that it "provide institutional machinery to effectuate that security in order to locate the conflict between citizen and state at
a juridically cognizable level." Id. The theorist's time may be spent more constructively on
more humanistic variations of marxian socialism than the Soviet.
70 See S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, PSYCHITRIC TERROR: How SOvIET PSYCHIATRY IS USED
TO SUPPRESS DISSENT (1977).
71 Indochina: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of
the Comm. on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, 23 (1978);
Kamm, The Agony of Cambodia, The N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1978 (Magazine), at 40.
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tivity of any human rights enthusiast, and I, along with Sinha 7' number
among this group.
H. An adequate human rights theory must accommodate economic
relativity.73 I have touched on the matter of economic relativity in the
preceeding discussion of the theory requisite of "order or priority." For
reasons stated there, a human rights theory which avoids the counterposition of bread before ballot is optimally flexible. To fashion a human
rights catalog wherein undeniably vital corporeal rights occupy exclusive
first priority is to place the implementation of the full range of human
rights, including the liberty-based rights, too much in the hands of domestic policy makers. They too commonly plead economic hardship, the
exigencies of nation building, hostile encirclement, and so forth, as due
cause for human rights footdragging. When d human rights theory thus
cuts more to the benefit of the state than to the individual we have no
better than state authority as the monopolistic dispensor of human
"rights."174 Liberty-based human rights in such an environment may be so
strongly qualified by the requirement that they be exercised compatibly
with the needs of the authority system that they are only defeasible
human rights.7 5 What such theory will have accomplished is the promo76
tion of human duty over the interest of human rights.
IV. CONCLUSION

In contemplating an anthropocentric theory of international law and
an anthropocentric basis for human rights one must avoid the step from
constructive idealism, with its real potential for shaping as well as for
describing reality, onward into detached utopian constructions. Reductive
methodology applied to this effect has emancipated human rights theory
from the tawdry political environment in which human rights subsist, but
only for limited scholastic purposes. Neither the concept nor the catalog
provided by the anthropocentric theory of human rights adequatly describe nor measure up to the present human rights predicament, notwithstanding growing global interdependence.
Cultural, ideological and economic relativity are to be conceded a
highly prized position in human rights theory and are to be promoted.
72Sinha, supra note 1, at 479.
7 Id. at 482.
74 See U.S.S.R. CONST. of 1977, art. 46, reprinted in CuRRENT DIG. SovIr PRESs, Nov.
9, 1977, at 5.
71 See, e.g., id. arts. 47 (freedom of scientific, technical and artistic creation), 50 (freedom of speech, press and assembly), 51 (right to unite in public organizations), 52 (freedom
of conscience or religion).
76Cohen, supra note 21, at 25.
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But the "tragic antinomies of human existence"' 7 also should be factored
into human rights theory. The human rights negative aspects of political
environments must be recognized as features beyond the salvation.of reductive relativity. It should little strain relativity and universalist tolerance to propose that the relatively "open," domestic political order, in
contrast to the authoritatian, is a more congenial environment for anthropocentrically perceived human rights. If such a congenial political order,
not further defined, is not a sine qua non to the articulation in reality of
an anthropocentric basis for human rights, then such a political order
perhaps beyond reach today, should be an aspirational human rights goal.
Then the first step toward an adequate human rights theory shall have
been achieved.

11 H.

MORGENTHAU,

supra note 23, at 209.

